Protections against Compelled Production of Private Papers in England and the United States by Lehman, Kenneth R.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 11
Number 2 Winter 1988 Article 5
1-1-1988
Protections against Compelled Production of
Private Papers in England and the United States
Kenneth R. Lehman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth R. Lehman, Protections against Compelled Production of Private Papers in England and the United States, 11 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 349 (1988).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol11/iss2/5
Protections Against Compelled Production
of Private Papers in England and the
United States
By KENNETH R. LEHMAN
Associate, Gaston & Snow, Phoenix. B.B.A. 1982, Temple
University; J.D. 1987, Hastings College of the Law.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court has
sharply limited fifth amendment protections against compelled produc-
tion of papers.' Under the reasoning of these cases, the contents of pri-
vate papers are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
In England, on the other hand, the state may not compel production of
self-incriminating evidence in a criminal case. This Note will trace the
history of the English privilege. It will analyze the interests protected by
the English rule and will compare the English system to that of the
United States. The comparison of the English and American systems
will be especially fruitful because the opposite approaches taken by the
two countries are rooted in a common history. This Note will also ana-
lyze whether current American law provides adequate protection against
compelled production of private papers by subpoena duces tecum. Fi-
nally, this Note will suggest an alternative to the current American
system.
The English protection against self-incrimination is deeply rooted in
a long history of oppression.2 An understanding of the privilege and the
evils against which it protects cannot be understood fully without an un-
derstanding of its historical context. Accordingly, this Note will trace
the history of the privilege from its origins in the thirteenth century to its
establishment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This Note
will show that, under English law, the privilege serves two interests. The
1. See, eg., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976).
2. The privilege originated in the infamous heresy trials which began in the latter part of
the fourteenth century and continued over a span of over two and a half centuries. See infra
notes 20-45 and accompanying text.
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
first is the cruelty interest commonly associated with the privilege-the
right to be free from being forced to answer questions which will be used
against the witness in a criminal proceeding. The second interest is the
right not to have one's privacy violated by being forced to answer self-
incriminating questions or divulge self-incriminating private matters, or
by being forced to produce self-incriminating personal documents.
Although the English courts have not distinguished between these inter-
ests, they are protected by the broad rule of evidence that prohibits com-
pelling self-incriminating testimony and production of evidence.
The United States privilege has evolved from the same history as the
English privilege. This Note will trace the development of the American
form of the privilege, beginning with an analysis of the drafting of the
fifth amendment.' Since the drafting of the fifth amendment and the first
decision interpreting the amendment,4 the Supreme Court has pared
away at the privilege. Most recently, the Supreme Court held that indi-
viduals are protected only against having to give self-incriminating "testi-
mony" which is later used against them in criminal prosecutions.5 This
rule leaves unprotected tax records of a sole proprietorship and arguably,
even an individual's most private papers, including diaries, letters, and
other personal writings.
Compelled production of documents also involves the fourth
amendment.6 This Note will analyze the specific fourth amendment safe-
guards which surround the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas to
produce documents. This Note will conclude by arguing that, because
the Court has sharply limited fifth amendment privacy protections, the
privacy interest is better protected by the fourth amendment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN ENGLAND
Although the authorities do not agree why the first protections
originated, it is settled that the privilege against self-incrimination was an
integral part of English common law before the end of the seventeenth
century.7 Although begun as a privilege applicable to forced oral testi-
3. See infra text accompanying notes 72-93.
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See infra text accompanying notes 94-
112.
5. Doe, 465 U.S. at 605.
6. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), cited with approval In
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-58.
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mony,8 by the second half of the eighteenth century the scope of the
privilege included not only oral testimony, but also the production of
tangible evidence which was self-incriminating. 9 In order to understand
the privilege as it now exists, this Note will explore this history.
A. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Ecclesiastical
Courts
1. The Oath Ex Officio
Sometime prior to the year 1076, separate ecclesiastical courts10
were established. Commentators agree that the roots of the privilege are
found in the opposition to the oath ex officio II administered by these
ecclesiastical courts. 2 Generally, these courts used an inquisitorial sys-
tem whereby witnesses were subject to questioning by the ecclesiastical
authority, who wished to use their testimony to obtain evidence to be
used against the witnesses themselves. The witnesses were subject to this
questioning even though formal charges had not been brought against
them. Witnesses were required to swear to answer all questions and to
answer them truthfully. The church formally sanctioned the oath in the
Constitution of Otho' 3 and in the Constitution of Bonifice.14
8. See infra text accompanying notes 31-63.
9. See infra note 63.
10. Bishops presided over these courts, which had jurisdiction over alleged spiritual mat-
ters such as marriages, wills, the correction of sinners, church properties, offenses against reli-
gion, heresy, atheism, blasphemy, sacrilege, witchcraft, perjury, profanity, schism, failure to
attend church, and violation of the sabbath. Another area of jurisdiction included "sins of the
flesh" such as fornication, adultery, incest, procuring, and bigamy. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OFTHE
FIFTH AMENDMENT 43-44 (1968).
11. Ex officio means the oath was given to a witness by the ecclesiastical authority whose
power to do so was derived solely by virtue of his ecclesiastical office. For a definition of the
oath, see infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
12. 8 J. WIGMOR., EVIDENCE § 2250, at 267, 270-84 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949). Wigmore argues that
the opposition was primarily a jurisdictional struggle between the ecclesiastical courts and
common law courts. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 2250, at 269. For purposes of this Note, the
importance of these events concerns the parameters of the objection to self-incrimination and
not whether the original objection was jurisdictional.
13. The Constitution of Otho of 1236 provided:
We do decree that the oath of calumny, by which the truth is more easily discovered,
and causes finished with greater celerity, shall in future be administered throughout
the kingdom of England in causes of an ecclesiastical and civil nature; according to
the canons in that behalf, notwithstanding any custom to the contrary.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 270 n.6 (citing translation in WHrrE, THE CONsTrru-
TIONS OF OTHo (1844)). The oath of calumny provided that during interrogation, witnesses
could not deny what they believed to be true. Id.
14. The Constitution of Bonifice, adopted in 1272, provided:
We establish that, when the prelates and ecclesiastical judges inquire the faults and
1988"]
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It was in this context that the issue of self-incrimination was con-
ceived. At this early stage the question regarded the procedure whereby
witnesses could be put to oath. The ecclesiastical courts could call wit-
nesses who might not have been charged and require them to take the
oath. Although prosecution could not begin until there was a "present-
ment,""5 this requirement could be met by a statement of the prosecuting
authority, an official complaint, or by the testimony of the witnesses.1 6 It
was the practice of having witnesses serve as their first accusers which
was seen as offensive. This could occur when witnesses who testified
were not charged with a crime. The ecclesiastical authority was able to
question uncharged suspects in an effort to extract confessions or other
evidence which would serve as the presentment, since the oath required
witnesses to swear to answer all questions and to answer them truthfully.
Witnesses were unable to confront their accusors or know of the evidence
against them.
17
The ecclesiastical procedure demonstrates the two interests involved
in many cases in which compelled testimony is used. First, evidence ob-
tained from witnesses was used to criminally indict them-a result in-
itally seen as cruelty. Second, since private evidence was coerced from
witnesses, their interest in privacy was violated, even if the evidence was
not used against them in court.18 The ecclesiastical courts were the only
courts of their day to utilize the oath procedure.19 Ironically, these courts
excesses of their subjects that deserve punishment, the lay be compelled if need re-
quire by sentences of excommunication to give an oath to say the truth; and if any
withstand or let this oath to be given, he shall be bridled with the sentence of excom-
munication and interdiction.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 270 n.7 (citing translation in BULLARD & BELL,
LYNDWOOD'S PROVINCIALE 44 (1929)).
15. The presentment (or inquisitio) was a preliminary condition requiring probable
grounds of "infamy or bad reputation." This condition could be established by "the existence
of either notorious suspicion (clamosa insinuatio) or common report (fama) (which was some
sort of public rumor)." L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 23.
16. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 275.
17. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 47.
18. The privacy interest is demonstrated further by the objection to the use of one's co-
erced testimony against others. For example, in some cases the ecclesiastical authority would,
in Levy's words,
[compel] the husband to confess his heresy and then to implicate his wife. She was
forced to confirm his guilt, to admit to her own, and betray her children. In succes-
sion each member of the family was put to the oath and examined, so that father
accused son, the son his sister, the children their parents, and friends their neighbors.
L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 61. In cases such as this, the distinction or the two interests is even
more clear, because the compelling of self-incriminating testimony is only a part of the objec-
tionable conduct by the ecclesiastical authority.
19. Id. at 280-82.
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were the forum where privacy concerns seemed to be the greatest; their
inquisitions were into moral matters and matters of conscience.
2. The Oath Ex Officio in Heresy Trials
The manner in which the the oath ex officio was used in heresy20
inquisitions inspired the development of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as we know it. In 1401, Parliament enacted a statute called De
Ilaeretico Comburendo,2 I which prohibited heretical preaching and au-
thorized the bishops to arrest any person suspected of heresy.2 The Stat-
ute authorized the burning of heretics.' Use of the oath ex officio in
these cases was a general practice.24 From 1401 until 1534 (when the
Act was repealed) approximately fifty individuals were burned as here-
tics. 5 Thousands were persecuted in other ways for their religious be-
liefs.2 6 Even the repeal of the Act did not end the persecution, which
continued unabated for another century. Understandably, the oath came
to be the focus of popular resentment, because it was the use of the oath
which brought to light the private beliefs and practices of witnesses.2 7
Early opposition to the oath, however, was grounded in little more than
strained biblical interpretation 8 and terrifying accounts of martyrdom in
20. The importance of eradicating heresies, or "errors of faith," id. at 21, is illustrated by
the following quote:
England was a devout Catholic nation in an age that was absolutely convinced of the
duty of the state to support the Church's infallible judgments on spiritual matters.
The state was responsible, as a partner of the Church, for the souls of its subjects and
was obliged to protect them against heresy; its existence threatened eternal damna-
tion for all who were victims of its contagion. There was one fixed body of revealed
and absolute truth. To suffer deviations to exist was thought to reflect doubt on the
purity of the faith and the sincerity of the convictions of true believers. Moreover,
any sovereign who did not bid the command of the Church on matters of faith might
expose himself to be condemned as a heretic, suffer excommunication, and expose his
nation to interdiction.
Id. at 54.
21. De Haeretico Comburendo means "the act for the burning of heretics." Id at 57 (cit-
ing J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 443 (1883)).
22. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 58-59.
23. Id. at 57.
24. Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id.
27. Seesupra note 18.
28. The following passage was often used by those opposed to the oath:
Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not
forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: But I say unto you,
Swear not at all; neither by heaven; for it is God's throne: Nor by earth; for it is his
footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King. Neither shalt thou
swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
the face of the oath.29
One of the first official recognitions of these concerns was an act
promulgated by Henry VIII in 153330 that required two witnesses to ac-
cuse an individual of heresy before he or she could be arrested. The Act
indicates the scope of the objections to the oath at that early stage. Since
the statute did not prohibit compelled self-incrimination, the public com-
plaints concerned only the practice of questioning witnesses before they
were charged with crimes.
3. Establishment of the Modern Privilege
It was not until the middle of the seventeenth century that the privi-
lege began to look like its twentieth century incarnation. During this
time the High Commission 31 sought to force conformity with Anglican
Church rituals and ceremonies. The Commission often acted ex officio,
assuming the role of accuser, prosecutor, judge, and jury.3 2 What was
especially noxious about the Commission was its use of the oath to com-
pel evidence of the witness' conscience. It was in this context that John
Lilburn, the man most responsible for the development of the privilege,
focused attention upon the use of the oath.
Lilburn was first tried for shipping seditious books into England
from Holland.33 He was accused by two of his coworkers, but claimed
innocence.34 Prior to his trial, the attorney general's chief clerk ques-
tioned him about the acts of other individuals. Lilburn claimed that
your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these
cometh of evil.
Matthew 5:33-37 (King James). This passage is from a discourse known as the Sermon on the
Mount. It may have been directed at those who, because of the sanctity of oaths, felt that
ordinary phrasing need not be truthful.
29. See generally, J. Fox, THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF JOHN Fox: A NEW AND
COMPLETE EDITION (S. Cattley ed. 1837-41).
30. An Act for Punnysshement of Heresye (1533), quoted in Morgan, supra note 12, at 6.
31. The High Commission had its origin in the commission established by Queen Mary in
1557. Before 1557 various commissions were established to enforce the official religion. These
commissions operated through the old ecclesiastical courts. In 1557, however, Queen Mary
established a new commission to supersede the others "for a severer way of proceeding against
heretics." L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 76. In its time, this body became the Court of the High
Commission, an ecclesiastical arm of the Privy Council and the Star Chamber. Id. at 76,
32. Id. at 268.
33. Trial of Lilburn and Wharton, In the Star Chamber, Y.B. 13 Car. I, pl. 148 (1637),
reprinted in 3 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1315 (1809).
34. Levy points out that "Lilbur's guilt seemed certain because two of his confederates
had accused him in order to save themselves. One of them had made his accusations by sworn
affidavit .... All that was needed were the confessions of Lilburn and [his accomplice]." L.
LEVY, supra note 10, at 273.
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these questions were not germane to his charge and refused to answer
them. Lilburn argued:
I am not imprisoned for knowing and talking with such and such men,
but for sending over Books; and therefore I am not willing to answer
you to any more of these questions, because I see you go about this
Examination to ensnare me: for seeing the things for which I am im-
prisoned cannot be proved against me, you will get other matter out of
my examination: and therefore if you will not ask me about the thing
laid to my charge, I shall answer no more .... 35
Lilburn's objection was similar to those of earlier critics; the attor-
ney general sought information concerning matters for which Lilburn
was not charged. As to the matter for which he was charged, Lilburn
claimed no privilege against self-incrimination. He merely claimed inno-
cence.36 Two weeks later Lilburn appeared before the Star Chamber
where he refused to swear to answer truthfully all questions asked of him
before being charged with specific crimes. 37 Lilburn was returned to
prison.38 Approximately two months after his arrest, Lilburn was
brought before the Star Chamber, where he again refused to take the
oath.39 The court returned Lilburn to prison and placed him in solitary
confinement.' At his trial a week later Lilburn refused to take the oath
for a third time. The court found Lilburn guilty of contempt for his
refusal, and ordered him imprisoned, fined, and tortured.4"
By 1640 popular opposition to the High Commission brought Eng-
land dangerously close to a civil war. Finally, reforms were instituted by
the Long Parliament, which was dominated by Puritans and common
35. Trial of Lilburn and Wharton, 3 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1318.
36. In this regard Lilburn argued: "But if you will ask of[my charge], I shall then answer
you, and do answer that for the thing for which I am imprisoned, which is for sending over
books, I am clear, for I sent none." Id.
37. In Lilburn's words, "You must swear said he. To what? 'That you shall make true
answer to all things that are asked of you.' Must I so, sir? but before I swear, I will know to
what I must swear." Id at 1320.
38. Id at 1321.
39. Up to the time of Lilburn's trial, refusals to take the oath occurred when the oath was
given before charges were brought. Thus, since the normal procedure in the Star Chamber was
for the presentment by bill of complaint to precede the swearing of the accused, there had
rarely been refusals to take the oath in the Star Chamber. In Lilburn's case, however, only a
verbal complaint was read as well as the affidavit from Lilburn's coworker who had accused
Lilburn (although this affidavit may have served as a substitute for the formal charge). L
LEvY, supra note 10, at 275.
40. Trial of Lilburne and Wharton, 3 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1323; L LEVY,
supra note 10, at 275.
41. Trial of Lilbume and Wharton, 3 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1327.
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lawyers. On November 3, 1640, Lilburn was freed.42
In 1641 the Government abolished the High Commission4 3 and the
Star Chamber.' The Act that abolished the High Commission also set-
tled the matter of the oath with respect to the remaining, lower ecclesias-
tical courts. The Act prohibited anyone acting under ecclesiastical
authority from subjecting individuals to an oath by which witnesses
would either be forced to be their first accusors or would be forced to
confess.45
B. The Privilege in Common Law Courts
1. History of the Privilege
The situation in the seventeenth century common law courts was
different. In these courts no oath was used. It was common practice,
however, for the courts to try to obtain confessions from suspects before
indictment and arraignment." At trial, questioning of suspects was a
significant part of the procedure.47 The courts prohibited the use of tor-
ture to extract confessions, but silence in the face of an incriminating
question could be taken as an implication of guilt.
4 1
In the 1642 Proceedings Against the Twelve Bishops,49 a common law
42. Id. at 1342-43; L. LEvY, supra note 10, at 278-79.
43. The Act for the Abolition of the Court of High Commission (1641), reprinted In, S.
GARDINER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 186-89
(1906).
44. The Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber (1641), reprinted in, S. GAR-
DINER, supra note 43, at 179.
45. The Act stated:
[No ecclesiastical authority] shall ex officio, or at the instance or promotion of any
other person whatsoever, urge, enforce, tender, give or minister unto any church-
warden, sidesman or other person whatsoever any corporal oath, whereby he or she
shall or may be charged or obliged to make any presentment of any crime or offence,
or to confess or to accuse him or herself of any crime, offence, delinquency or misde-
meanor ....
The Act for the Abolition of the High Commission (1641), reprinted in S. GARDINER, supra
note 43, at 186, 188.
46. Levy notes:
Only the Crown had a right to subpoena witnesses and take their testimony under
oath. Sworn testimony was a privilege, for it added immeasurably to the credibility
of the witness. Indeed, because sworn testimony was so highly regarded the accused
himself was not permitted to testify under oath even if he wanted to.
L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 283.
47. Id. at 282.
48. Id. at 282-83.
49. Y.B. 17 Car. I, pl. 158 (1641), reprinted in 4 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 63.
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court first recognized the right against self-incrimination. 5° By statute,
the bishops, who had always sat in the House of Lords by virtue of their
office, were excluded from the Puritan-controlled House.5' The bishops
petitioned the king,52 alleging that all "laws, orders, votes, resolutions,
and determinations" made in their absence were "null, and of none ef-
fect."5 3 Because of this petition, the House of Commons charged the
bishops with high treason.54 At trial before the House of Lords, the bish-
ops were asked "[w]hether they did subscribe the Petition now read, and
whether it was their hand-writing."" The bishops refused to answer,
arguing that "it was not charged in the impeachment; neither were they
bound to accuse themselves."56 The House of Lords arguably recognized
the privilege claimed by the bishops, for they did not force the bishops to
answer.
This trial was particularly noteworthy for three reasons. First, since
the bishops had already been charged and knew of the evidence against
them, the claimed privilege was broader than a privilege against being
forced to provide the information upon which the courts would base a
charge. Second, the forum in which the right was claimed was a nonec-
clesiastical court. Third, the right apparently was claimed successfully by
particularly unsympathetic plaintiffs; these were the same bishops who
had denied the privilege against self-incrimination to the Puritans who
now judged them.57
The argument that one should not be condemned for refusing to
answer incriminating quesions even after charges were brought was espe-
cially attractive to religious sects such as the Puritans. When the oath
was in use, the Puritans and other religous groups without political
power at that time consistently suffered the brunt of that procedure be-
cause the Government deemed their beliefs and actions illegal. The Puri-
tans believed that if they answered untruthfully they would be judged by
God because they considered perjury to be a sin.58 On the other hand, if
50. Levy says that the case was "[t]he first sign of respect accorded the right against sdf-
incrimination [im the common law courts]." L. LEvY, supra note 10, at 284.
51. Clerical Disabilities Act, reprinted in S. GARDINER, supra note 43, at 241-42.
52. Proceedings Against the Twelve Bishops (1642), reprinted in 4 T.B. HOWELl, supra
note 33, at 63-69.
53. Id at 69.
54. Id See L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 284-85.
55. Proceedings Against the Twelve Bishops, 4 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 76.
56. Id
57. L. LEvY, supra note 10, at 285.
58. Id at 284-85.
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they answered truthfully, they would certainly be severely punished for
acts compelled by conscience.
The press was a primary means of voicing various religious and
political views. Parliament sought to stem the tide of expression by en-
acting seditious literature statutes. John Lilburn was one of the more
prolific pamphleteers of the time and was also a vociferous defender of
freedom of the press. In 1649, Lilburn was again arrested, indicted, and
charged with high treason.59 The Government tried Lilburn before a
jury, eight common law judges, the Lord Mayor of London, the Re-
corder of London, four sergeants-at-law, and twenty-six other special
judges such as city aldermen and members of Parliament.' Several pam-
phlets allegedly authored by Lilburn served as the basis for his charge.
Lilburn's defense was that the prosecution had not proved that he was
the author. The self-incrimination problem arose when he refused to an-
swer whether the handwriting was his own. The jury eventually acquit-
ted Lilburn. After Lilburn's trial, the privilege against self-incrimination
became an established right.61
2. Expansion of the Privilege: Current Status in England
In the ensuing decades, the courts expanded the privilege as part of
the concepts of fair play and due process of law.62 In the eighteenth
century, the privilege, which originally developed as aL protection against
compulsion of oral testimony, was extended to protect against the com-
pulsion of incriminating personal papers.63
59. Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilbum (1649), reprinted in 4 T.B. HOWELL, supra
note 33, at 1269. Levy also provides an entertaining account of the trials of the obstinate John
Lilburn. L. Lvy, supra note 10, at 271-313.
60. Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburn, 4 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1269; L.
LEVY, supra note 10, at 301.
61. Levy notes:
Lilbum had made the difference. From his time on, the right against self-incrimina-
tion was an established, respected rule of the common law, or, more broadly, of
English law generally. Examen Legum Angliae: Or the Laws of England, a book
published in 1656, recalled the oath ex officio had violated "the Law of Nature,"
claimed that the nemo tenefur maxim was "agreed by all men," discoursed on the
soundness of the maxim, cited Nicholas Fuller's Argument, and observed that in
neither criminal cases at common law nor in chancery cases involving fraud was a
man obliged "to confess the truth against himself." The right against self incrimina-
tion did not prohibit inquiry nor even incriminating interrogatories, but it did permit
a refusal to answer without formal prejudice or penalty.
L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 313.
62. Id. at 331-32.
63. In Roe v. Harvey, 98 Eng. Rep. 302 (K.B. 1769), in which plaintiff sought to have
defendant produce a deed necessary to support his title in ejectment, Lord Mansfield noted
that "in a criminal or penal cause, the defendant is never forced to produce any evidence;
[Vol, I I
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Since the time of Lilburn, the privilege against self-incrimination has
become axiomatic in English law." Furthermore, it is accepted without
discussion that defendants cannot be compelled to produce tangible evi-
dence, including private papers, which incriminate themselves.6 5 The
English privilege has developed as a rule of evidence while its American
counterpart is considered a rule of criminal procedure.66 The signifi-
cance of this is that the English rule is generally cited with little or no
discussion of its policy underpinnings.67 Accordingly, one must deter-
mine the policies underlying the English rule by considering its history.
The English history reveals that there are two interests served by the
privilege. First, there is the interest against cruelty commonly associated
with the privilege-a witness' right to be free from being forced to an-
swer questions which will be used against the witness later in a criminal
proceeding. Second, there is the right not to have one's privacy violated
by being forced to give self-incriminating answers or reveal self-incrimi-
nating private thoughts. Clearly, this second interest includes self-in-
criminating private thoughts committed to paper. The English courts,
however, do not formally distinguish between the two interests. By
broadly prohibiting the practice of compelling self-incrimination through
testimony or production of evidence, the courts implicitly protect the pri-
vacy interest. Since the production of any self-incriminating evidence
though he should hold it in his hands in court." In King v. Purnell, 96 Eng. Rep. 20 (K.B.
1749), the attorney general's request to inspect corporate books was denied because the books
were private and granting such a rule would "make a man produce evidence against himself, in
a criminal prosecution .... We know of no instance wherein this court has granted a rule to
inspect books in a criminal prosecution nakedly considered." rd at 23.
64. See eg., Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation M.D.L Docket
No. 235 (No. 1), 3 All E.R. 703 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L.) (1978), which notes:
The common law has for centuries held that a person is not bound to answer a ques-
tion which may render him liable to punishment, penalty or forfeiture. ... "It is one
of the inveterate principles of English law that a party cannot be compelled to dis-
cover that which, if answered, would tend to subject him to any punishment, penalty,
forfeiture... 'no one is bound to incriminate himself."'
Id. (quoting Redfern v. Redfern, All E.R. 524, 528 (1886-90). See supra note 63. See also 17
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 240 (4th ed. 1977).
65. See e.g., Trust House v. Postelthwaite, 108 LP. 546 (1944). In Postelthwaite the
defendant refused to produce an invoice requested by the prosecution. The magistrate inter-
vened and ordered the documents produced. The defendant was convicted and subsequently
appealed. In quashing the conviction and holding the document inadmissible, the appeals
court held that the magistrate could not compel production. rd at 13. See supra note 63.
66. As an established rule of evidence, the privilege is not a flexible device which can be
tailored to serve the interests it represents. The American rule, on the other hand, is more
flexible and continues to evolve. See infra text accompanying notes 68-176.
67. See supra notes 64, 65.
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may not be compelled under any circumstances, distinctions need not be
made based on privacy, and the need for special treatment is obviated.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Procedure to Compel Production of Papers
In the United States, production of evidence may be compelled by a
subpoena.68 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that fail-
ure to comply with a subpoena may be deemed contempt of court.69
Courts may excuse noncompliance with a subpoena if the party is unable
to comply or if the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a subpoena. 70 The
potential for abuse of the subpoena process becomes apparent when one
considers the number of authorities able to issue subpoenas: grand juries,
prosecutors, administrative agencies, and legislative committees.71
B. Fifth Amendment Protections Against Compelled Production of
Private Papers
1. History
The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."72 To understand the intent of the authors of
this amendment and the legislature which adopted the amendment, 71 one
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
69. See United States v. Goldfine, 169 F. Supp. 93 (D.C. Mass. 1958), affid, 268 F.2d 941
(1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 842, which noted:
In a case of alleged criminal contempt for willful failure to comply with a judicial
subpoena or order addressed to a defendant requiring him to produce a record...
the Government must ordinarily prove these six elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt: (1) that the Court issued an order for the production at a particular
time and place of a record adequately described in the order, (2) that the defendant
was served with (or otherwise knew of) the order, (3) that the record existed at the
time the order was served, (4) that the defendant had control (or lawful power to
acquire control) of the record, (5) that the defendant failed to produce (or cause the
production of) the record, and (6) that the defendant acted willfully.
Id at 98.
70. In subpoena cases the contempt power is used to force compliance and not to punish.
8 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 117.12 (2d ed. 1988).
71. See 2 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 189 (1978).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
73. James Madison was the original author of the self-incrimination clause. In House
discussion, however, language was added to the clause to restrict its application to criminal
courts. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 422-25.
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must consider the history of the privilege against self-incrimination in
America in the time preceeding the amendment.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the privilege against self-in-
crimination was tenuously and unevenly established throughout the colo-
nies.' An example of the application of the privilege in one jurisdiction
is found in the Trial of Colonel Bayard." This case illustrates that the
privilege included the right not to be compelled to produce self-incrimi-
nating documents. The defendant Bayard allegedly had authored ad-
dresses accusing Chief Justice Atwood and Lieutenant Governor Nanfan
of actions ranging from bribery to oppression. Lieutenant Governor
Nanfan arrested Bayard and his confederate Hutchins. Nanfan ordered
Hutchins to produce copies of the addresses, but Hutchins refused. He
and Bayard were imprisoned and thereafter, were convicted. Bayard's
friends in England petitioned the Board of Trade, claiming that the court
had attempted to force Hutchins to incriminate himself. The attorney
general in England agreed, stating that "it appears by the warrant for
committing Hutchins that the Council required him to produce a libell
[sic] he is charged to be the author of which was to accuse himself."
'76
The Privy Council found the convictions illegal. The most important
aspect of the case is that, in defending his conduct, Chief Justice Atwood
implicitly recognized the privilege and its application to the compelled
production of papers. Atwood stated: "But since [Hutchins] was not
committed for High treason, as he might have been, and since there
wanted no Evidence against him; this, surely may answer the Objection
against requiring him to produce Papers which might tend to accuse
himself."
77
Bayard indicates that at the turn of the eighteenth century a prohibi-
tion against compelled production of self-incriminating documents was
found wherever the privilege against self-incrimination was found. More-
over, as the political and economic systems of the colonies matured, they
increasingly reflected English law,78 which prohibited the compelled pro-
duction of incriminating papers. 79 By the time of the revolution, the
74. Id. at 368.
75. Trial of Colonel Bayard (1702), reprinted in 14 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 471.
See L. LEvy, supra note 10, at 379-80 (for history and circumstances surrounding the case).
76. L. LEvy, supra note 10, at 380, citing IV DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEw-YoRK 954 (E. Callaghan & B. Fernow eds. 1853-87) (em-
phasis from Levy).
77. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 380, citing The Case of William Atwood, Esq. (1703), in
XIII NEw-YoRK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, COLLECTIONs 269 (1881).
78. L. LEvY, supra note 10, at 368.
79. See supra notes 61, 63.
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privilege was clearly established and was virtually identical to that of
England. °
Prior to the signing of the Constitution of the United States, most
states had established their own constitutions. 81 Virginia's was particu-
larly important because other states copied it and because, in several re-
spects, it served as a model for the Bill of Rights.82 Section 8 of Virginia's
Declaration of Rights provided that
in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand
the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the ac-
cusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy
trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose
unananimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be com-
pelled to give evidence against himself, that no man be deprived of his
liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.
83
Interestingly, literal interpretation of this language suggests that it
prohibited courts from compelling the production of self-incriminating
"evidence" other than testimony. The language does not indicate that
Virginia's intent was to reduce the self-incrimination protections previ-
ously found in the colonies. Since the privilege was then nearly identical
to the English privilege84 which clearly prohibited compelling production
of self-incriminating documents,85 there can be little doubt that Virginia,
and the colonies that copied section 8, contemplated a similar prohibi-
tion.86 There were no further changes in the privilege until the adoption
of the Bill of Rights.
It is unlikely that James Madison's intent, as demonstrated by his
wording of the Bill of Rights, was to change the state of the common law
with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination. His papers, how-
ever, do not reveal his precise intent in this area.87 Madison's original
proposal for the fifth amendment self-incrimination provision read:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more
than one punishment or trial for the same offence; nor shall be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his
80. See generally L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 368-404 (for selected cases and discussion).
81. Id. at 405.
82. Id. at 409.
83. Virginia Declaration of Rights, reprinted in L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 405-06 (em-
phasis added by Levy).
84. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 61, 63.
86. See also notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
87. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 423.
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property, where it may be necessary for public use, without just
compensation.
s
Madison's use of this language was novel-none of the states had
used similar phraseology to define a right against self-incrimination. 9
Despite what this language may suggest, it is likely that Madison
contemplated a prohibition against compelling self-incriminating
"evidence."
The subsequent proposal, which the Constitutional Convention
adopted, provided that the constitutional privilege be confined to crimi-
nal cases. John Lawrence of New York suggested this change.9° In mak-
ing his suggestion, Lawrence described the substantive provision of this
section of the fifth amendment as assuring that "a person shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself."91 In suggesting that this
prohibition be confined to criminal cases, he noted that the amendment
would be "a general declaration in some degree contrary to laws
passed."92 Levy suggests that this later comment referred to the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, which had been passed recently by the Senate.93 Section
15 of the Judiciary Act empowered the federal courts to compel civil
parties to produce their books or papers containing relevant evidence.
Prior to its restriction to criminal cases, the fifth amendment could be in
conflict with section 15 of the Judiciary Act only if the amendment pro-
hibited the compulsion of papers and documents in both civil and crimi-
nal cases. Accordingly, when the House limited the privilege to criminal
cases, the ban on compelling the production of self-incriminating papers
and documents remained in effect with respect to criminal cases.
2. Boyd v. United States
The first important case in the area of compelled production of in-
criminating papers is Boyd v. United States.94 In Boyd, the prosecutor
charged the defendant with importing cases of glass into the United
States without paying the required duties. The district attorney filed a
civil information for forfeiture of the thirty-five cases of plate glass. The
88. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 Q. Gales ed. 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison on June 8,
1789), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 422.
89. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 423.
90. Id. at 424-25.
91. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (statement of Rep. Lawrence on Aug. 17,
1789), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 424-25.
92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 ([1. Gales ed. 1834) (statement of Rep. Lawrence on Aug.
17, 1789), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 424-25.
93. L. LEVY, supra note 10, at 425-26.
94. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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action was brought under an act providing that anyone who intended to
avoid paying the required taxes when bringing merchandise into the
country was guilty of a crime. Under the act, violators could be impris-
oned for two years and fined five thousand dollars. 5 The statute also
authorized forfeiture upon a finding that the defendant committed the
crime.96 The prosecutor, seeking to prove the quantity and value of the
boxes of glass, subpoenaed the defendant to produce the invoices of the
boxes of glass. The district judge ordered the invoices produced. The
defendant complied with the notice and produced the invoices, but ob-
jected to the validity of the notice and the constitutionality of the law.
The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court did not base its decision solely on the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination prohibition. Instead, the Court opted for
a more comprehensive approach to the issue. It held that the fourth and
fifth amendments should be used in the analysis of the statute. The Court
stated:
It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's
private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit
his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it
is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of
search and seizure. 7
Having tied the compulsory production of papers to the fourth amend-
ment, the Court continued:
The principle question, however, remains to be considered. Is a
search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory pro-
duction of a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in
a proceeding to forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the reve-
nue laws-is such a proceeding for such purpose an "unreasonable
search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution?
98
In effect, the Court held that the fifth amendment did not stand on
its own. In tying the fifth amendment to the fourth amendment, the
Court limited the privilege against self-incrimination, with respect to
physical evidence, by the rules applicable to search and seizure cases.
Commentators and Supreme Court justices viewed this approach as pro-
95. Id at 617.
96. Id
97. 116 U.S. at 622.
98. Id (emphasis deleted).
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tective of civil liberties.9 9
The fourth amendment, the Court said, primarily protects property
interests. 100 Thus, the Court implied that a search for property in which
the Government had a proprietary interest was permissible, but a search
for property over which the Government had no claim was impermissi-
ble. °10 The Government's claim could be upheld if possession of the
property seized was illegal:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable
to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally differ-
ent things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and
papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or
using them as evidence against him.
10 2
This opinion was the precursor of what was later called the mere
evidence rule. This rule said that a search for mere evidence of a crime
could not be authorized. For the search to be proper, the Government
must have some sort of proprietary interest in the item. An example of
an appropriate state interest would be if the item was an instumentality
of a crime or an item whose posession was illegal."°3 The Court did not
explicitly find that the fifth amendment also protects a property interest
in physical evidence. The Court, however, did link the fifth amendment
to the fourth amendment, which was found to protect property rights.
Thus, a search for, or compelled production of, physical evidence violates
the fourth amendment if the Government does not have a proprietary
interest in the object item. To support the proposition that the fourth
amendment protects property rights, the Court cited the English case of
Entick v. Carrington,"° which held that search and seizure decisions
were to be based on property law. Entick was primarily a search and
seizure ease, however, and was not a self-incrimination case.105
Although Boyd used the case as authority for intertwining the two dis-
tinct issues, this was not the holding of the Entick case.
Entick does, however, provide support for the mere evidence rule.
In Entick, the plaintiff brought an action for trespass; breaking and en-
99. See, eg., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("Boyd v. United States [is] a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the
United States.").
100. 116 U.S. at 623-24.
101. Id
102. Id at 623.
103. See infra notes 113-127 and accompanying text.
104. 116 U.S. at 623; Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (L.B. 1765), reprinted in 19
T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1029.
105. Entick, 19 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1030, 1063-74.
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tering the plaintiff's house; breaking open chests, drawers, and boxes;
and reading the private papers and books found inside. 1°6 The defendant
police officers did not deny the allegations. Instead, they argued that
their actions were justified because the search was pursuant to a war-
rant." 7 The opinion of the court, delivered by Lord Chief Justice Cam-
den, dealt with several issues in assessing the legality of the search. The
court based its holding on property law; a search is a trespass which can
be excused if justified. 1o A search would be justified if the searching
party held a proprietary interest in the item seized." °9
The court in Boyd, however, relied upon tougher language from En-
tick. In Entick, the plaintiff argued that
no power can lawfully break into a man's house and study to search
for evidence against him. This would be worse than 'the Spanish inqui-
sition; for ransacking a man's secret drawers and boxes, to come at
evidence against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret
thoughts."o
Lord Camden agreed:
Lastly, it is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a
means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some
cases had been shewn, where the law forceth evidence out of the
owner's custody by process. There is no process against papers in civil
causes. It has been often tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the
adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper
evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action.
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet
there are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and
house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more
atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in
these cases to help forward the conviction.
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness o[ the law towards
criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more
pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say.
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust;
and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the
same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the
106. Id. at 1030.
107. Id. at 1030-32.
108. Id at 1066.
109. Id. at 1067. See infra notes 113-127 and accompanying text.
110. Entick, 19 T.B. HOWELL, supra note 33, at 1038.
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guilty.1
1 1
The quoted section from Entick, however, was merely dicta used to sup-
port the holding that the search was illegal. The rule from Entick is that
a search is illegal if it violates property law, and that the state violates
property law if it searches for or seizes an item in which it has no propri-
etary interest.
Entick indicated that the "search" failed not only because it violated
property laws, but arguably because it also violated self-incrimination
prohibitions. When the Boyd court quoted the language from Entick to
buttress the previous argument that compelled self-incrimination is a
search, the Court apparently held that compelled self-incrimination was
a search that was unconstitutional because it violated the prohibition
against self-incrimination!
The Entick court described a self-incrimination prohibition so broad
that it touches a search and seizure situation. Nevertheless, the search
complained of in Entick was found to be illegal because of property law,
not because of the self-incrimination prohibition. The Boyd court, how-
ever, described a self-incrimination provision so weak that it could not by
itself prohibit the very thing it had been understood to prohibit-the
compulsion of incriminating evidence.
One important idea stands out in both Boyd and Entick-the impor-
tance and sanctity of private papers. In Boyd, the Supreme Court quoted
Entick with approval on this point:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly
bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England
be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and car-
ried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of
the trespass. 112
As discussed previously, the effect of the Boyd analysis was that, as
regards physical evidence, the fourth and fifth amendments were inter-
twined. Accordingly, study of the developments in the application of the
fourth amendment is necessary to understand the Court's interpretation
of the fifth amendment. Even though the dicta in Boyd suggested a pro-
hibition against paper searches when the government had no proprietary
interest, it was not until Gouled v. United States11 3 that the Court ex-
111. Id. at 1073.
112. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (quoting Entick, 19 T.B. HOWELL, supra
note 33, at 1066.
113. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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tended this proposition to prohibit the seizure of any evidence over which
the government had no proprietary interest.
Gouled concerned the admission into evidence of documents
searched for and seized pursuant to a warrant. The Court held that it
could not authorize searches of a home or office solely for the purpose of
obtaining evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. A search might
be authorized, however, if the state has an interest in the property to be
seized, or a right to possess it, or if its possession by individuals is ille-
gal." 4 The Court added, "There is no special sanctity in papers, as dis-
tinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from
search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of
the cases in which other property may be seized... ,"I5 Since Boyd had
linked the fourth and fifth amendments, at least with regard to physical
evidence, these rules were presumably equally applicable to the fifth
amendment protections for physical evidence.
The lack of protection for private papers, then, must be analyzed in
the context of the Court's holding. The Gouled case turned on the
Court's view of the proprietary interest involved. The case merely stands
for the proposition that there is no special proprietary sanctity in papers.
Gouled is especially important because it rejects any notion of a privacy
interest. 116
3. Recent Cases: The Modern Fifth Amendment Protections
In Schmerber v. California,117 the Supreme Court further limited the
privilege against compelled production of self-incriminating evidence. In
Schmerber, the defendant was arrested at a hospital while receiving treat-
ment for injuries suffered in a recent automobile accident. Over his ob-
jection, a blood sample was extracted from Schmerber at the direction of
a police officer. A chemical analysis of the blood sample revealed a
blood-alcohol level which indicated that Schmerber was legally intoxi-
cated. The judge admitted the evidence of the chemical analysis at trial,
and Schmerber was convicted of driving while under the influence of al-
cohol. 18 The defendant argued that the extraction of blood violated his
privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.'1 9 Writ-
114. Id. at 309.
115. Id.
116. See Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 Micd. L. RaV,
184, 190 (1977). Since there is no difference between documents and mere chattels, the privacy
protection is entirely a proprietary interest.
117. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
118. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
119. Id.
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ing for five members of the Court, Justice Brennan found that the privi-
lege against self-incrimination protects a witness only from being
compelled to testify against himself or to provide the state with evidence
of a "testimonial or communicative nature."12 Justice Brennan found
that Schmerber's blood sample was not evidence of such a nature.
1 2 1
A strict interpretation of the words of the fifth amendment might
also have allowed the court to admit the evidence. Schmerber may have
been forced to produce self-incriminating evidence, but arguably he was
not forced to "be a witness against himself."" Brennan recognized this
argument but declined to follow it, noting:
It could not be denied that in requiring petitioner to submit to the
withdrawal and chemical analysis of his blood the state compelled him
to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be used to
prosecute him for a criminal offense.... The critical question, then, is
whether petitioner was thus compelled "to be a witness against
himself'
23
In a footnote, Brennan continued: "Many state constitutions, including
most of the original Colonies, phrase the privilege in terms of compelling
a person to give 'evidence' against himself. But our decision cannot turn
on the Fifth Amendment's use of the word 'witness.' ,24
In support of the proposition that "evidence" and "witness" re-
ferred to the same prohibition of testimony or communications, and not
literally "evidence," Brennan quoted Counselman v. Hitchcock:
[A]s the manifest purpose of the constitutional provisions, both of the
states and the United States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony
of a self-incriminating kind from a party or witness, the liberal con-
struction which must be placed upon constitutional provisions for the
protection of personal rights would seem to require that the constitu-
tional guaranties, however, differently worded should have as far as
possible the same interpretation .... 125
The Court in Counselman, however, cited Boyd with approval, and
quoted several passages from that case which specifically held that the
compelled production of self-incriminating private papers was unconsti-
120. Id at 761.
121. Id
122. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
123. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 76L
124. Id at 761-62 n.6.
125. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584-85 (1892), quoted in Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 761-62 n.6.
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tutional. 126 Thus, the "same interpretation" contemplates a privacy pro-
tection for these private papers.
In support of the assertion that the fifth amendment prohibits only
compelled self-incrimination using "testimonial" or "communicative"
evidence, Brennan cited two lines of precedent. First, to support the
proposition that precedent required the testimonial communication dis-
tinction, Brennan cited Holt v. United States.127 The Holt court held that
compelling the accused to submit to a demand to model a blouse did not
violate the privilege. Brennan further cited federal and state cases which
found no fifth amendment violation in compelling defendants to submit
to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements; to write or speak for
the purpose of identification; or to appear in court, stand, walk, or make
a particular gesture.128
Second, as an example of when self-incriminating evidence is privi-
leged, Brennan quoted Miranda v. Arizona:
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state
or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To
maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government
"to shoulder the entire load" . . . to respect the inviolability of the
human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands
that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evi-
dence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the
cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. 129
By alluding to the Court's previous use of the privilege in a forced confes-
sion case, Brennan implied that this sort of communication is the sort
which is protected by the fifth amendment.
Brennan claimed that the quoted passage "implicitly recognizes...
[that] the privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it
helps to protect suggest." 130 But the passage from Miranda does not
suggest that the privilege be limited to compelled oral testimony. In-
stead, it suggests that the policy of the fifth amendment requires, at the
very least, that evidence against defendant not be "compelled from his
own mouth." In fact, Miranda argued for a fifth anendment with broad
126. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 580-81.
127. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
128. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (citing the cases collected in 8 Y. WIoMORVl, supra note 12,
§ 2265).
129. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966), quoted in Sehmerber, 384 U.S. at 762
(citations omitted).
130. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762-63.
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protections. Miranda specifically cited procedures in England and other
countries, 131 noting that
[the United States should] give at least as much protection to these
rights as is given in the jurisdictions described [mcluding England].
We deal in our country with rights grounded in a specific requirement
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, whereas other jurisdic-
tions arrived at their conclusions on the basis of principles of justice
not so specifically defined.
132
The result of Schmerber did not differ from the results of the earlier
tests, since Brennan specifically found that "communications" includes
private papers.133 Nevertheless, the Court's test in Schmerber is very dif-
ferent from the English test. First, in Schmerber, the privilege is becom-
ing a rule of criminal procedure. As such, it is a fluid and constantly
evolving right which is weighed and balanced as the circumstances vary.
As the Court pointed out, "There will be many cases in which such a
distinction [between communications or testimony and real or physical
evidence] is not readily drawn."' 34 The privilege in England is a com-
mon-law rule that, over the years, has developed into a rule of evidence
rather than a rule of criminal procedure.
In Fisher v. United States,135 and United States v. Doe,'36 the
Supreme Court limited the parameters of "communication." In Fisher,
the Court held that the fifth amendment did not protect the contents of
documents prepared by a person other than the defendant. The Court
upheld a summons that required the defendant's attorney to produce
documents prepared by the defendant's accountants. The Court found
that the documents would be privileged in the hands of the attorney if
they would have been protected while in the hands of the defendant. 37
The contents of the documents, however, would be unprotected in any
case since the privilege only protects a person from being incriminated by
his own "compelled testimonial communications." The Court found no
protection under the facts of the case since the accountant's workpapers
were not the taxpayer's. Since the taxpayer did not prepare the
workpapers, they contained no testimonial declarations by him.' Fur-
ther, since the preparation was voluntary, the papers simply did not
131. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486-89.
132. Id at 489-90.
133. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
134. Iad at 764.
135. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
136. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
137. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396.
138. Iad at 409.
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"contain compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers or of
anyone else." '13 9 Arguably, the holding adequately protected the defend-
ant's privacy interest, since the papers could not have contained commu-
nications that revealed the mind of the defendant. In a footnote,
however, the Court added, "The fact that the documents may have been
written by the person asserting the privilege is insufficient to trigger the
privilege." 1" In addition, the Court stated that:
The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the
Fourth Amendment. They struck a balance so that when the State's
reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes suffi-
ciently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to
search and seize will issue. They did not seek in still another Amend-
ment-the Fifth-to achieve a general protection of privacy but to
deal with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.
1 41
The Court held, however, that the act of production may involve
communicative aspects regardless of the contents. The production of
papers might be communicative because compliance with a subpoena
concedes that the papers produced are in existence, that they are in the
possession and control of the subpoenaed party, and that they are the
papers requested. 142 In Fisher, however, the Court found that these tacit
concessions did not rise to the level of testimony within the protection of
the fifth amendment, since the Government did not rely on the testimo-
nial aspects of the act of production.
1 43
Thus, under the reasoning of Fisher, there is no protection for the
most private of papers. Since the fifth amendment contains no distinct
privacy protection, the contents of private papers are unprotected as long
as the state does not compel the writing of the papers. Furthermore, the
testimonial aspects which the Court found in the actual production of
papers provide protection in very few situations.
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately be-
cause he feared that the opinion would sweep away fifth amendment pro-
tections for purely private papers. 144 Brennan argued that privacy is a
"central purpose" of the privilege against self-incdmination, and not
merely a "byproduct" of other protections. 145 Brennan argued that there
139. Id. at 409-10.
140. Id. at 410 n.11.
141. Id. at 400.
142. Id. at 410.
143. Id. at 410-11.
144. Id. at 414-15.
145. Id. at 416.
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is a zone of privacy protected by the fifth amendment, including certain
"books, papers, and writings."" If an article is within the zone, the
state cannot compel its production. The fifth amendment, he argued,
protects testimonial evidence in which there is a "reasonable expectation
of privacy."14 7 One relevant factor in determining whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a paper is the "degree to which
the paper holder has sought to keep private the contents of the papers he
desires not to produce." '148 Under this analysis, "Papers in the nature of
a personal diary are a fortiori protected under the privilege." 
1 49
Brennan correctly pointed out that there are privacy implications
when production of self-incriminating papers is compelled. The Fisher
majority, however, found that separate interests were dealt with sepa-
rately by the authors of the fourth and fifth amendments-privacy is ex-
plicity protected by the fourth amendment and may be protected only
incidentally by the fifth amendment. 150
United States v. Doe"' presented the question addressed in the
Fisher footnote. The respondent in Doe was the owner of several sole
proprietorships that were served with five subpoenas during the course of
an investigation into corruption in the awarding of county and municipal
contracts. The subpoenas requested the production of a list of virtually
all the business records, bank statements, and cancelled checks of two of
the respondent's companies. The respondent filed a motion in federal
district court to have the subpoenas quashed. With respect to the re-
spondent's papers that were not required by law to be kept, the district
court granted the motion on the grounds that the act of production
amounted to testimony regarding the existence, possession, and authen-
ticity of the requested documents. 52 The court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the
case.
153
146. Id. at 415, 424.
147. .ra at 424.
148. Id at 425.
149. Id at 427.
150. In this regard the Court stated:
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its lan-
guage, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned in
its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to
the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination,
not [the disclosure of] private information."
d at 401-02 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
151. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
152. Id at 611-12.
153. Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion, and Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
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The Doe Court noted that Fisher expressly declined to answer
whether the fifth amendment protects the contents of' an individual's tax
records that are in his possession. The Court categorically rejected the
argument that the contents of documents are privileged if the creation of
the documents was not compelled.
154
The Court then addressed the issue previously examined in Fisher:
whether the act of producing the papers constituted testimony. The
Court refused to overturn the finding of the district court that the act of
producing the documents involved testimonial self-incrimination.'"5 The
Court further noted, however, that production of the documents could
have been compelled by granting immunity with respect to the testimo-
nial aspects of the production.'
56
The Doe approach was mechanical in the sense that the Court ap-
plied the rules of Fisher with no discussion of policy underpinnings. The
Court merely noted, "The rationale underlying our holding in Fisher is
... persuasive here."' 157 The concurring opinions, however, went further.
Justice O'Connor concurred separately in order to express her opinion
that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the
contents of private papers of any kind."' 15
Justice Marshall, with whom Brennan joined, concurred with the
majority's opinion that the production of documents could not be com-
pelled without a statutory grant of immunity. In their view, however,
the Court did not need to consider whether there are any fifth amend-
ment protections for the contents of private papers. They argued that the
papers at issue were business records, and "the case presented nothing
remotely close to the question that Justice O'Connor eagerly poses and
answers."' 59 Business records, Marshall argued, involve privacy con-
cerns less than do personal diaries or other personal papers.
160
To date, the Court has not directly considered whether there is any
fifth amendment privacy protection for nonbusiness papers. Language
from Fisher and Doe, however, indicates that any fifth amendment pri-
vacy protection is merely incidental to the main purpose of the fifth
amendment. Since the reasoning of Fisher and Doe is that contents of
opinion. Justice Marshall concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed an opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.
154. Id. at 610-12.
155. Id. at 617.
156. Id.
157. Id at 610.
158. Id at 618.
159. Id at 619.
160. Id.
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documents are unprotected if their creation was voluntary, it is likely
that Justice O'Connor's view1 61 represents the majority in this regard.
C. Fourth Amendment Protections
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,162 the Supreme Court
established the fourth amendment test for subpoenas of papers. In that
case, the Federal Wage and Hour Administrator subpoenaed the business
records of Oklahoma Press in order to determine whether Oklahoma
Press was subject to the minimum wage requirements and if so, whether
there was a violation of the requirements. The Administrator issued the
subpoenas pursuant to the enforcement provisions of section 9 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 9 provides that, for authorized
investigations, the Commission or its agents shall have access to and the
right to copy "any documentary evidence of any person, partnership, or
corporation being investigated or proceeded against," and the power,
pursuant to subpoena, to require "the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses and production of all such documentary evidence relating to any
matter under investigation." '163 Oklahoma Press argued that this proce-
dure violated the fourth and fifth amendments.
The Court quickly dispensed with the fifth amendment argument by
noting that the fifth amendment provides no protection for a corporate
officer against compelled production of corporate records.'" With re-
gard to the fourth amendment, Oklahoma Press argued that the sub-
poena would allow the Administrator to "conduct general fishing
expeditions into [the corporation's] books, records and papers, in order
to obtain evidence that the corporation violated the Act." 165 Oklahoma
Press also argued that the subpoena violated search and seizure rules
since the search would be done with no prior charge or complaint; the
purpose was to secure information upon which to base a charge.'"
The Court found, however, that the subpoena presented no question
of actual search and seizure. The opinion stated:
No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioner's premises
against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books,
records or papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to or-
ders of court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity
161. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
162. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
164. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 196.
165. Id at 195.
166. Id
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to present objections, which in fact were made.167
In finding that there was no search, the Court indicated that the
fourth amendment concern for privacy primarily involved the corpora-
tion's interest in having its place of business free from the intrusion that
occurs during a search. The Court did not discuss any privacy interest
that Oklahoma Press may have had in the papers themselves.' 68
In Oklahoma Press, the Supreme Court outlined the fourth amend-
ment protections that are available in the case of subpoenas of papers.
The Court held that one does not need to satisfy the safeguards sur-
rounding the issuance of a search warrant. Thus, a specific charge need
not be made, nor must there be a complaint of a violation of law. Fur-
thermore, the requirement that a search warrant be issued only upon a
showing of "probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation" 169 is sat-
isfied in the case of a subpoena if the subpoena is reasonable. The Court
found that there are three considerations when determining whether a
subpoena is reasonable: the subpoena cannot be too broad or indefi-
nite, 170 the agency that issues the subpoena must be authorized to make
the inquiry, and the materials requested must be relevant to the
inquiry.1 7
1
On its face, the three-part test from Oklahoma Press does not ad-
dress privacy concerns. Furthermore, the Court held that the fourth
amendment search and seizure rules that protect privacy are inapplicable
to subpoenaed documents.' 72 Nevertheless, thirty years later, the Fisher
court held that the fifth amendment did not protect against the disclosure
of private information since, "The Framers addressed the subject of per-
sonal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment."'' 73 Read together,
Fisher and Oklahoma Press seem to bar any consideration of privacy con-
cerns when production of documents is compelled by subpoena.
Oklahoma Press, however, must be read within its context. The
Oklahoma Press Court gave no consideration to privacy concerns be-
cause there was no privacy argument presented. The Court noted that
the papers were of "a corporate character" and added that, "Historically
167. Id.
168. Perhaps the privacy interest in these papers did not merit discussion because of the
reduced privacy expectation that a corporation has in such papers.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
170. The Court stated that "specification of the documents to be produced [must be] ade-
quate, but not excessive, for the purpose of the relevant inquiry." Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at
209. This inquiry varies according to the purpose and scope of the investigation.
171. Id.
172. See id
173. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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private corporations have been subject to broad visitorial power... [and]
it long has been established that Congress may exercise wide investi-
gatorial power over them."174 Furthermore, in United States v. Morton
Salt Company,'75 the Supreme Court said that "corporations can claim
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy."'
176
Thus, the Oklahoma Press test particularly concerned subpoenas of busi-
ness papers for which there is a much lower degree of privacy expecta-
tion. Doe and Fisher also considered business papers. Perhaps the
present tests do not include a privacy inquiry because such a situation
has never been presented to the Supreme Court.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND
AMERICAN RULES
The most illuminating comparison of the English "evidence" ap-
proach and the American "criminal procedure" approach comes from
considering the ability to compel production of three types of papers: (1)
papers regarding matters of public record, (2) business or tax records,
and (3) intimately private papers.
The broad English rule prohibits the compelled production of pa-
pers regarding matters of public record, but the American rule allows the
compelled production of such documents. Of the two interests of cruelty
and privacy, only the former is involved if the state compels production
of papers of this type. In the same situation, the English rule is a blunt
instrument, since the interests militating against the production of such
papers are minimal. Nevertheless, since these types of papers are easily
acquired by other means, the state's interest in procuring evidence from
the defendant is also minimal. Thus, although the approaches are very
different, the results are basically the same-the evidence will be ob-
tained and used against the defendant.
Doe presented the situation in which the state tries to compel the
production of business or tax records. In such a case recognizable pri-
vacy considerations exist, but these considerations do not rise to the level
of the interest in intimately private papers. As a result of Doe, American
courts allow the production of the papers to be compelled. The English
approach prohibits the compelled production of these papers.
The final situation is when production of intimately private papers is
compelled. Again, English courts prohibit compelled production of these
174. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 204.
175. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
176. Id at 652. See 2 W.R. LAFAvE, supra note 71, at 211.
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papers. The American rule is not as clear. This Note proposes that pri-
vacy considerations be applied to both the second and third situations.
V. PROPOSALS
The comparison above reveals that, as regards privacy, the single
English rule is a blunt instrument that perhaps protects too much. Since
there are two interests implicated in forced production, two tests should
be used to determine whether the compelled production is objectionable.
This Note proposes that a fourth amendment probable cause test, as well
as a fifth amendment self incrimination test, be applied in such circum-
stances. The interests implicated in the compelled production of private
papers touch both the fourth and fifth amendments, but the amendments
are not intertwined and neither are the interests they protect. This was
the shortcoming of the reasoning in Boyd;.77 in tying the amendments
together their individual protections were bound to suffer. If the
Supreme Court isolates the protected interests, however, the protections
can be tailored more closely to the interests served by the Bill of Rights.
When production of private papers is compelled, the fifth amend-
ment applies, but the privacy aspect of the fourth amendment also should
be involved. The Supreme Court has not adequately addressed the pri-
vacy concerns. Oklahoma Press, which provides the current test for sub-
poenas, only protects against the burdens of compliance with
subpoenas. 178 This protection is an appropriate fourth amendment con-
cern, but it should not be the exclusive fourth amendment privacy con-
cern. There is no reason that the Oklahoma Press test can not coexist
with search and seizure rules regarding privacy. The Supreme Court has
not addressed the intrusions that occur when private papers are searched
after their production has been compelled. There can be little doubt that
opening the cover, turning the pages, perusing through the words, or
otherwise exposing the contents of papers containing the author's most
intimate thoughts violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. This vio-
lation demands application of the probable cause safeguards that sur-
round the fourth amendment. Arguably, the same privacy protection is
not present in the case of business or tax documents, but this should be
determined by application of the same rules.
In the case of searches and subpoenas, the privacy intrusions are
essentially the same, but they occur in a different manner. On the one
hand, a subpoena is less intrusive because police do not search desks and
177. See supra text accompanying notes 94-112.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 160-76.
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drawers while armed with a subpoena. Moreover, the legality of a sub-
poena may be challenged before documents are produced. Searches and
seizures pursuant to a warrant may not be challenged in advance. On the
other hand, if a specific item is subpoenaed, privacy is protected less be-
cause the item cannot be hidden or otherwise made difficult to find, as in
the case of a search.
Under the proposed test, only if the state can establish the required
level of cause may it obtain the private papers by a search pursuant to a
warrant or by compelled production pursuant to a subpoena. The level
of cause required for either, however, must be the same. A lower stan-
dard of cause for subpoenas than for searches does not adequately ad-
dress the privacy intrusions.
Applying the probable cause test would satisfy the Schmerber ma-
jority, which was concerned that the production of "communications"
not be compelled.179 The proposed test would make unnecessary some of
the fine distinctions a court must make when it decides whether evidence
is testimonial. Furthermore, under this test the Fisher majority's conten-




The examination of the common history of the privilege against self-
incrimination in England and the United States reveals two distinct inter-
ests. First, there is the interest in not cruelly being forced to incriminate
oneself. Second, there is the privacy aspect of being forced to provide
self-incriminating private information.
It is the first interest upon which courts in both countries have fo-
cused. In broadly defining the situations in which the interest against
cruelty is to be protected, the English courts have provided broad protec-
tion for the privacy interest. This broad protection of the interest against
cruelty bars compelled production of incriminating private papers. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has isolated the two interests,
and does not specifically prohibit compelled production of incriminating
private papers.
In the United States, the fifth amendment protects one from being
forced to incriminate oneself. The Supreme Court has defined this pro-
tection narrowly to include only an incidental protection of privacy inter-
ests. Privacy interests, the Court has held, are protected by the fourth
179. See supra text accompanying notes 120-33.
180. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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amendment. Generally, the Court has applied search and seizure rules to
protect this interest. In the case of subpoenaed documents, however, the
Court has determined that the fourth amendment only protects against
burdensome subpoenas. The test used by the Court has no privacy
element.
Thus, intimately private papers are inadequately protected from
production pursuant to subpoenas. This Note proposes that opening the
cover, turning the pages, and otherwise exposing the contents of such
papers be treated as a search, requiring probable cause and other fourth
amendment privacy protections. The privacy interest would be protected
by such a requirement because, if the level of cause required for a search
of the papers were established, the papers could also have been obtained
by a search of the premises in which the papers were located.
